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of the traditional non-kin social organizations had an economic motivation.

In rural areas, organizations such as the Red Spear Society (Hung-ch'iang Hui) and the Mutual Protection Society (Lien-ya Hui) existed for the protection of the inhabitants against roving bandits. These voluntary associations arose in areas where the government failed to maintain order and peace, and their organization cut across class and occupational lines. When landlords were forced to move into towns during periods of disorder, peasants and tenants would become so powerful that at times they defied the landlords' demand for exorbitant rents.

Among the artisans and workers in China there were for generations both craft builds (hongs) and regional guilds (pongs). As in Europe, these guilds were not intended to serve the interests of workers as a class, but to promote the crafts and guard their monopoly and secrets. Both employers and employees were members, but the employers usually dominated the guilds' activities.[5]

Another kind of association existed to serve travelers, who were usually merchants, in

5. Nym Wales, The Chinese Labor Movement, New York, The John Day Co., 1945, p. 7.

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involved 21,900,000 members, or 73 per cent of the total population of 30,000,000. Among the workers in twleve cities and the laborers employed at the Hsin Yü coal mines, 71,711, or 47 per cent, of a total of 152,613 men, were members of the trade union.[10]

In ten hsiang in Chia county, 223 landlord families and 283 rich peasant families, 9 per cent of the population of 5,863 families, owned more than 1,900 mou (about 316 acres) of land before the "Liberation" -- 49 per cent of the land in the ten hsiang. Although the anti-despot movement and the rent-reduction movement had reduced their holdings, the average acreage owned by "landlords" and "rich peasants" remained nearly twice as much as that owned by the peasants and hired farmers. After reform, the average amount of land owned by the "landlord" became 1.46 mou (about 1/6 of an acre), that of the poor peasants was raised to 1.5 mou, that of the rich peasants to 1.9 mou, and that of the middle peasants was increased from 2 mou to 2.7 mou.[11] These figures suggest how sweeping the land reform movement was. Land reform was of first importance to the Communist regime because its inauguration gained the support of the peasants who formed the majority of the population.

Hupeh Province, in the Yangtze Valley, has a greater concentration of industry than the neighboring Honan Province. As in other provinces, land reform became a major part of the Communist program in Hupeh. Li Hsien-nien, chairman of Hupeh, reported that the movement for rent re-

10. Ibid., p. 828.
11. Ibid., p. 828.

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B. PARTY CONTROL OVER MASS ORGANIZATIONS

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Communist policies toward mass organizations have been well calculated and effectively carried out. These policies encourage and regulate the activities and political utilization of mass organizations.

From the Party point of view, mass organizations are a political asset because each of these mass organizations represents a specific segment of the populace and is itself a social or economic force.

Immediately after the Communist seizure of power in this region, mass organizations sprang to life. Not until 1952, however, was their organization placed upon a pe-manent basis. There are as many mass organizations in this region as at the central level.[45] The most influential are here si gled out to illustrate the pattern of Party control.

1. Trade Unions

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Trade unions are regarded as the transmission

45. See Chao Kuo-chün, The Mass Organization in Communist China, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Institute of Technology, 1953.

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belt by which the Party and the workers are linked.[46] Their organization is patterned after that of the Party. A Central-South China Trade Union Working Committee is established as the delegate of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions.[47] Under the regional Working Committee, local trade union councils stretch from provinces, municipalities, and counties to towns (hsiang is not included, for farmers and handicraft workers are not considered eligible).

The establishment of Party control over the trade unions in the Central-South China region did not prove easy. A gigantic and drastic campaign was required before control was comfortably secured. The "democratic reform" campaign, launched in the midst of land reform in the summer of 1951,[48] was directed at the trade unions and was aimed at the

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46. Chinese text of the Constitution of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions in People's Daily, May 14, 1953, p. 2; English text in Current Background, No. 248, June 22, 1953.

47. The Working Committee was formally established on October 4, 1952, Hsin Wuhan Pao [New Wuhan Daily], Oct. 5, 1952, p. 2; prior to that it was known as the Preparatory Committee of the Trade Unions.

48. Provincial reports on the completion of the movement in Kwangtung, see Yangtze Daily, Nov. 28, 1951, p. 2; in Honan, ibid., Nov. 27, 1951; in Canton, Yangtze Daily, Nov. 29, 1951, p. 3.

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liquidation of old trade union leadership and the strengthening of the Communist hold over the urban populace.

To facilitate the Party's political control over trade unions, there is a basic trade union branch or cell, similar to the Party branch, composed of the trade union members working in the same enterprise. If the branch is of sufficient size, this basic trade union committee will set up a workshop (department) committee. The trade union committee may be divided into trade union teams according to production units. The general methods employed by the Party for political control over other organizations are applicable here, of course. Trade union affairs are subject to the direction of the Party commission on trade unions; and Party members are placed in key positions within the unions.

However, the most effective method is the initiation of union policies in the Party rather than in the union.[49] This involves three steps: first, the Party branch within the union initiates major policies, including directives, working plans, and cadre policy. Secondly, the Party branch suggests to the presidium of the Trade Union Council policies in need of discussion. Party members elected to the presidium direct the trade union meeting and successfully pilot the Party proposal through the presidium. Third, after the resolution is adopted, Party and corps members must accept it unconditionally and serve as

49. People's Daily, May 8, 1953, p. 2.

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activists to make certain that it is carried out.

2. Federation of Democratic Women

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On October 27, 1951, Ch'ien Ying, then Chairman of the Federation of the Democratic Women of the Central-South China region, declared that the federation's membership had reached twenty-one million, or almost one-third of all the women of the region.[50] The federation's importance in this region, however, is not based merely on numerical supremacy. The position of women in society is such that they not only constitute an important part of the labor force, but their influence extends throughout the entire population. The Communists correctly regard the federation as a major political force and are most eager to see that women's organizations are formed.

At the village level, the federation is the most active part of the rural movement. The wide participation of women in the Peasants' Association should be particularly noted. The provincial Federation of Democratic Women of Hupeh alone mobilized 12 million women during the Land Reform Movement, almost 40 per cent of the total membership of the peasant's associations in the provinces.[51] The Federation plays a political role in all the farm drives and gives full support to the hsiang governments and party apparatus. Since the completion of land reform, women have begun to take an active part in the

50. Yangtze Daily, Oct. 28, 1951, p. 1.
51. Ibid., Dec. 3, 1950, p. 4; July 13, 1951, p. 3.

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D. Secret Societies, Gangsters, and Vagrants

Secret societies in China are generally characterized by their resistance to social changes dictated by a central authority. Their different origins and motives of organization notwithstanding, the above-mentioned common characteristic alone is enough to place all secret societies in China under Communist attack.

In Central-South China, the Communists made use of the land reform in an attempt to destroy secret socieities in the rural areas. In the cities, the Communists instituted a "democratic reform" in April 1951 to dislodge groups and cliques in control of labor organizations. The "democratic reform" was carried out in consonance with three slogans issued in succession by the Communists. The first slogan -- anti-feudalism -- called for a violent, frontal attack on existing secret societies and obsolete labor union leadership (labeled as "bossism"). The second slogan urged "democratic unity" among the rank and file in labor organizations. The third slogan emphasized the theme of "democratic management," which meant that Communist-dominated labor unions were to be organized to replace the old ones.[21]

Measures employed by the Communists during the Democratic Construction Movement were similar to those used in the movement to suppress counterrevolutionaries. A large-scale propaganda drive was launched to arouse public feeling and was

21. Yangtze Daily, July 21, 1951, p. 1. For provincial report on this movement, see article on Kwangtung in ibid., November 26, 1951, p. 2; also on Hupeh, ibid., April 25, 1951, p. 5; and Kwangsi, ibid., November 28, 1951, p. 2.

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LABOR

I. ORGANIZATION OF TRADE UNIONS

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The number of wage-earners and salaried employees (exclusive of farm labor) in the six provinces and two municipalities of Central-South China amounted to 23,000,000 in October 1950. From 1950 to 1952 industrial production trebled, with a corresponding increase in the number of workers. Since the launching of the Communist's first Five-Year Plan and the building of three new industrial districts in this region,[1] the working class of Central-South China has had a greater share of the burden of national reconstruction of China under the Communist regime.

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Having had experience in labor organization in other regions which had been "liberated" before Central-South China, the Communists encountered relatively few difficulties in their work of unionization. By October 1950, as many as 60 per cent of the workers of this area had been unionized.[2] The Preparatory Committee of the Central-South Federation of Trade Unions was established in July 1950, but was dissolved October 1952. The Central-South

1. The three new industrial districts are: (1) the Chengchow-Loyang area of Honan Province; (2) the Wuhan area in Hupeh Province; and (3) the central part of Hunan Province.

2. Kung-jen Jih-pao [Workers' Daily], Peking, Oct. 3, 1950, p. 4.

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office of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions was established after the Communists decided to centralize the trade-union structure and tighten Party control in this region.

The Wuhan area is the largest industrial and commercial center in Central-South China. By the end of 1950, there were 22 industrial trade unions organized, and 660 basic unions were formed in individual factories, mines, and workshops; 58 per cent of the 260,000 workers were unionized.[3] Because Wuhan was a transit port in both domestic and foreign trade, half of its working population worked directly or indirectly for the transportation system and most of the transportation workers employed on wharves, warehouses, piers, and ferries were organized in 1950.

According to incomplete statistics at the time of "liberation," there were 152,613 workers in Honan Province, 47 per cent of whom were unionized by the end of 1949. The lack of large-scale industries and the political "backwardness" of workers in Honan made the Communists' efforts to organize labor there less fruitful than in other provinces of this region.[4]

Kiangsi is another place in Central-South China where trade-union organization lagged behind. In mid-1950, after two years of work by the Communists, only 10 per cent of the workers in that province had

3. Cheng-fu Kung-tso Pao-kao Hui-pien [Compendium of Government Reports], Peking, 1951, pp. 830-31.

4. Workers' Daily, Jan. 19, 1950, p. 4.

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joined unions. Conditions in Nanchang, the provincial capital, were better; 80 per cent of the textile and telecommunication workers were unionized, while 12,000 stevedores and porters were organized[5] by the end of 1949.

The Preparatory Committee of the Hunan Office of the Central-South Federation of Trade Unions was established by the end of 1949. Workers in such cities as Changsha, Heng-yang, Hsiang-t'an, Yüeh-yang, and Chu-chou organized their trade unions in 1949.

Canton in Kwangtung Province had been one of the centers of light industry in Central-South China. The working class of that city had been well organized before the Communists took over. At the time of the occupation by the Communists in December 1949, Canton had 340,000 workers (including clerks and employees of stores), or about 26 per cent of the city's population of 1,300,000. The Preparatory Committee of the Canton General Trade Union was established by the Communists in December 1949. Immediately after this, 26 of the major trade unions were taken over by the Committee.[6] Because Canton was a main port in the Central-South handling foreign trade, a seamen's union and unions of stevedores were formed in August 1950.

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5. Ibid., May 20, 1950, p. 1.

6. Chuang-kuo Kung-jen [Chinese Worker Monthly], Feb. 15, 1950, p. 82, and March 4, 1950, p. 1.

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Some of the Communist press reports have indicated that the Communist work on the organization of trade unions in Central-South China has not been without its difficulties. According to the Communists, both the leaders of the trade unions and the rank and file of the working class seemed unable to understand fully the significance of the "new democracy." The union cadres adopted a "closed door" policy, excluding most of the technicians, ordinary employees, and temporary workers from the trade-union organization. As to the workers, they had not enough confidence in those who led them. For instance, some shop clerks in Kaifeng instead of asking help from their trade union, negotiated directly with the owner of the shop for a wage raise without notifying their union. They thought that the union was a nuisance rather than a help. Workers still did not realize that they were "masters of the nation."[7]

It was a lack of "democratic spirit" on the part of the trade-union leadership as much as political awakening on the part of the working class that inspired the "Democratic Reform" Movement in the Central-South region about the middle of 1950.

II. LABOR DISPUTES

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In a speech delivered by Teng Tzu-hui on the occasion of the formal opening of the Office of the Preparatory Committee of the Central-South

7. Workers' Daily, Oct. 5, 1950, p. 1.

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caused bad feelings among workers toward the Party in Hupeh.[11] This state of affairs had been common in other parts of the country but was avoided in later stages of the labor movement. 468

III. DEMOCRATIC REFORM AND POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION AMONG THE WORKING CLASS

In the course of organizing the Chinese working class in 1949 and 1950, the Communists discovered that "reactionary elements" were still active in factories and mines and on wharves and docks. Some of these "reactionary elements" were organizers of secret societies such as the I-kuan-tao [the Unity Society], the Chiu-kung-tao [the Nine Palace Society], the Hung-pang [the Red Society], and the Ch'ing-pang [the Green Society]; others were alleged to be Nationalist agents or remnants of the Nationalist army. To the Communists, it seemed necessary to start a political movement among the masses to clean such remnants of feudal rule from industry in order to prepare the country for socialization. 668 467

A conference called in Hankow by the Central-South Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in May 1951 initiated the "Democratic Reform" Drive among the working class in this region. The movement as defined by Yeh Chien-ying, Chairman of Kwangtung Province, covered workers in four main industries: (1) public factories and enterprises; (2) shipping stevedores or dock coolies; (3) inland river transportation; and (4) private factories and enterprises. Schools and government departments did not come within its

11. Workers' Daily, Dec. 11, 1949, p. 4.

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scope and were not to be affected by the movement.[12] 668 467

By the end of July 1951, more than forty enterprises in the Wuhan area had developed a "Democratic Reform" Drive. The separate stages involved in developing such a movement within an enterprise were: (1) the launching of propaganda for "New Democracy" among the workers; (2) the organization of small units of workers for a struggle against "reactionary elements"; (3) the identification of the most obvious examples of such "reactionary elements"; and (4) the encouragement of workers to make accusations against those suspected of counterrevolutionary activities.

The Communists said that through these procedures many members of secret societies, escaped "landlords," local "despots," bandits, and Kuomintang officials were discovered hiding among the working class in this region.[13]

After the movement began in Canton, the local People's Government made 214 arrests within four months among the workers. Those arrested were sentenced to death, imprisonment, or public surveillance in accordance with the degree of their guilt.[14]

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12. Current Background, Hong Kong, U. S. Consulate General, Oct. 15, 1951, No. 128.

13. Ch'ang-chiang Jih-pao [Yangtze Daily], Oct. 3, 1951, p. 1.

14. Nan-fang Jih-pao [South China Daily], August 20, 1951, p. 1.

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The "Democratic Reform" Drive was aimed at the purge of trade unions and the political indoctrination of the working class. The Communist press claimed that, after their successful struggle against these "reactionary elements," the political consciousness of the workers was higher and the trade-union organizations were stronger than they had been.

The "Five-Anti" Campaign and the "Resist-American-Aid-Korea" Movement were two other drives launched among the working class by the Communists to give workers political indoctrination.

IV. LABOR EMULATION AND PRODUCTION

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"Labor emulation" is the Communist means of increasing labor productivity without increasing cost of production. In organizing "labor emulation," the following steps are involved: (1) workers are organized to discuss the state's production plans; (2) the trade unions, on behalf of the workers, sign collective contracts with their respective administrations; (3) production meetings are held to discuss production problems; (4) workers plan and submit "rationalization" proposals to increase efficiency and popularize "advanced" methods of work.[15]

Labor emulation began in China proper in 1950. By 1953, about 80 per cent of the workers of the country had participated in this drive, and, according to Communist reports, production has been increased.

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15. People's China, Peking, May 16, 1954, pp 6-8.